NEAL CONAN, host: This is TALK OF THE NATION. I'm Neal Conan, in Washington. The bloom of protest we call the Arab Spring led to profound change across North Africa and the Middle East. Apparently impervious autocracies cracked under the pressure of marches and demonstrations. Bleak predictability gave way to transition, sometimes with relative peace, sometimes amid clouds of teargas and even civil war.
Now everywhere across the region, everyone wonders what comes next. That question means different things in Libya or Syria, where the old regimes hang on, and in Egypt or Tunisia, where the people will elect new governments in just a couple of months. Expectation and reality vary from country to country.
If your family is from this part of the world, what's changed for you? Give us a call, 800-989-8255. Email us, email@example.com. You can also join the conversation on our website. That's at npr.org. Click on TALK OF THE NATION.
Later in the program, a writer who spent three months in Puntland to write "The Pirates of Somalia," but first after the Arab Spring, and we begin with Dalia Mogahed, executive director of the Gallup Center for Muslim Studies, who joins us here in Studio 3A. Nice to have you with us today.
DALIA MOGAHED: Thank you, it's great to be here.
CONAN: And let us begin with Egypt, where it appears that expectations of change are outpacing reality.
MOGAHED: They are. There is so much optimism. We took a survey in April and then again in July and found that 90 percent of Egyptians say that they plan on voting in the next election. Nine out of 10 also believe the next election will be fair. They believe the economy will improve.
There is so much optimism, but at the same time, there is also a great deal of concern about security issues, as well as local struggles with the economy. Even though the national economy is something that people are optimistic about, and the future, their lives have actually gotten much harder.
CONAN: The tourism that forms a large part of the country's economy is - well, that's gone on the rocks, and there's a lot of frustration, too, that change is not happening quicker.
MOGAHED: There is. About 75 percent of Egyptians want to see Mubarak go on trial, for example, and that hasn't happened yet. And that's just one example of a part of the revolution that has yet to manifest.
CONAN: Tunisia, very similar kinds of frustrations. We read of riots in the streets of Tunis in the past few weeks.
MOGAHED: Yes. There was so many expectations with what they were about to - what they were able to accomplish with peaceful protests. But like all transitions, they aren't happening fast enough.
CONAN: Also let me introduce another guest here in Studio 3A, Marwan Muasher, former foreign minister of Jordan. He once served as Jordan's ambassador to the United States. Now he serves as vice president for studies and a Middle East specialist at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. And thanks very much for coming in today.
MARWAN MUASHER: Thank you.
CONAN: And it's interesting: We've seen very different situations in countries that were led by civilian presidents: Egypt, Tunisia, Syria, Libya. Monarchies have enjoyed a very different fate, at least in the short run.
MUASHER: Well, you look at the monarchies like Jordan and Morocco for example. They enjoy, first of all, more legitimacy than many of the regimes that you talked about. The monarchies are not under attack. Reform of the monarchy is what people are asking for rather than an abolishment of the monarchy.
And so these countries have more time than other countries that have been led by minority regimes, you know, for decades. The question today is whether these countries will use the time wisely to get ahead of the street and put in place a serious reform process or think that this time, you know, might give them a false sense of security that they don't need to do much.
CONAN: You talked about minority regimes. The one kingdom that is a minority regime is in Bahrain, and that's where most of the trouble has been.
MUASHER: Obviously, Bahrain needs a political solution. It cannot be - the solution cannot be addressed through economic or through security means. You have 30 percent that are Sunnis, 70 percent that are Shiite. Obviously, the status quo is not sustainable, and you need a better form to run the country than what exists today.
CONAN: Let me ask you, though, a broader question, and it relates to some of the things that Dahlia Mogahed was just talking about, and that is this sense of expectation. A year ago, you would have said there is very little sense that change is even possible. Now it seems change is happening so fast, people can't keep track of it.
MUASHER: Well, we need to look at the process of change. On one hand, of course, there's a sense of empowerment that is permeating now across the region. For decades, Arabs felt the powerlessness - powerless over decisions either taken by their countries or by the outside community. That is being shattered.
There's a new sense of empowerment that they can have a say in the decision-making process and the future of their own country. But at the same time, I think it would be wrong to assume that this is going to be a linear process, a process that is going to go smoothly, without any problems.
Let us remember that most of these countries' civil society is almost absent. Political parties have not been given a chance to operate. Regimes' leaders have changed, but the regimes have not changed. The military is still strong in Egypt. It is still strong in Tunisia.
There are a lot of hurdles that need to be crossed, if you will, before people make a smooth transition to democracy. The economic models that need to be put in place are not clear, either.
In Eastern Europe, when the Berlin Wall fell, people knew what kind of economic model they wanted to migrate to, from a centrally-planned economy to a market-oriented one. In the Arab world, that's not the case. Economic reform has a bad name in the Arab world because it has not been coupled with a political reform process, and therefore many people feel that the benefits of economic reform over the last 20 years have gone to an elite few and have not been trickled to the general public.
And so there are many, many challenges that need to be addressed, and that is why I do not really like to call this the Arab Spring. I'd much prefer the phrase Arab awakening. This is the start of a long process that is going to be measured in decades rather than in months or years.
CONAN: Dahlia Mogahed, I know much of your work focuses on Tunisia, and in Egypt, as well. One of the things we were talking about was the economic model. This was, to some degree, perhaps overblown at the time, the Facebook revolution. But nevertheless, better educated, young, smart people were a key element in Tahrir Square that eventually overthrew the regime and triumphed.
Those people, are they going to be satisfied with the economic models that we've talking about? I mean, where are their energies going? Are they trying to start up businesses? And if they are, are they running into that ferocious Egyptian bureaucracy?
MOGAHED: Well, I think there's a lot of things going on. First of all, the intellectual elite that were the beginnings of the revolution in Egypt were motivated not so much by economic needs as much as a need for freedom, a need for justice, a need for dignity. And those were the kinds of things that we heard so often at Tahrir.
It doesn't mean that economic needs weren't there, but they weren't primary. Now, what are those same activists doing now? They're not focusing on the economy, actually. One of the problems in Egypt right now is there isn't enough debate on the economy. Everyone has almost flipped from only focusing on their basic needs and economic issues to now only talking about politics.
It's what you hear everywhere in Cairo, and I think that that's going to eventually catch up with Egypt, where they're going to have to think about what are those economic policies, not just what kind of elections they want.
CONAN: There's been obviously a great hunger for politics, and people are slurping it up.
MOGAHED: They sure are. It's really amazing.
CONAN: As people look forward, though, I mean, nobody knows what's going to happen in this election, nobody knows what the government's going to look like.
MOGAHED: Nobody does know. What is interesting in the polls, though, is that no one group has anything near a majority. So a lot of talk is - I hear a lot of talk about the Muslim Brotherhood. We found in our poll that they have about 15 percent support in the general public, not a majority by any means.
The interesting thing is that most existing political parties just have very little support. It's really a political white space in Egypt right now.
CONAN: You're nodding your head, Marwan Muasher.
MUASHER: I am. I think the Muslim Brotherhood in particular has been used as a scare tactic for so long by Arab governments to scare people, you know, away from pluralistic systems.
I think in closed political systems, where you only have two alternatives, either the political establishments or, you know, the Islamic opposition, people are going to flock to the Islamic opposition if they're not satisfied with the status quo.
In a pluralistic system, where you open up and offer alternatives to people, then the Islamic parties will have to compete against, you know, a multitude of other parties rather than just against the political establishment.
So I think, you know, this notion, particularly in the West, that you can ignore or exclude Islamic organizations from political activity is simplistic at best. What we do need to, I think, ensure is that all parties, Islamic and otherwise, commit to the principle of peaceful means and to the principle of political pluralism at all times.
And if Egypt and other countries succeed in enshrining these principles in the emerging constitutions, then over time I think we will have a healthy and pluralistic society in Egypt and elsewhere.
CONAN: Just as Tunisia and then Egypt led the parade of peoples who started marching in the streets and demanding changes, do they see themselves as models? If you ask them that question of whether they see themselves - and if so, they must be very proud.
MOGAHED: There is a tremendous amount of national pride in Egypt right now, specifically where I've been, where I visited after the revolution. Just one example of that is before the revolution, about 25 percent of Egyptians wanted to leave Egypt, wanted to migrate. And it correlated very well with their satisfaction of their standard of living.
What's so interesting now is that people's satisfaction with standard of living has actually decreased after the revolution, yet their dedication to Egypt has increased. Their likelihood of wanting to stay in Egypt, despite all the hardships, has actually skyrocketed.
So in so many different ways, people now feel like they have a sense of ownership, that they have a stake in this game called their country's future. Before the revolution, they very much saw themselves as observers.
CONAN: Also saw a lot of people go back who had left and emigrated, and now they want to be part of that future, want to take part.
MOGAHED: There is. Anecdotally, I've heard of many people quitting their job in the Gulf and going back to Egypt to help build.
CONAN: We're talking about the Arab Spring, or Arab awakening, if you prefer, and what comes next in countries from Tunisia and Egypt to Libya and Syria. If your family is from this part of the world, what has changed for you? Give us a call, 800-989-8255. Email us, firstname.lastname@example.org. Stay with us. I'm Neal Conan. It's the TALK OF THE NATION from NPR News.
(SOUNDBITE OF MUSIC)
CONAN: This is TALK OF THE NATION from NPR News. I'm Neal Conan in Washington. Change continues to sweep much of North Africa and the Middle East. That change, though, looks very different in different countries.
Today in Libya, government forces disguised as rebels attacked opposition fighters near the strategic oil town of Brega. The standoff and the NATO air campaign continue there.
Syrian forces opened fire on a funeral procession today in the city of Homs, as that country's four-month-old uprising continues. And in Tunisia, where the Arab spring began, the interior ministry says an unknown group blew up a pipeline that carried fuel from Algeria. Violent protests have broken out in recent days as the country prepares to vote in October on a group to draft a new constitution.
We're talking today about what comes after the Arab spring. Our guests are Dalia Mogahed, who serves as executive director of the Gallup Center for Muslim Studies and co-wrote the book "Who Speaks for Islam: What a Billion Muslims Really Think"; and Marwan Muasher, former foreign minister of Jordan who now serves as vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, author of "The Arab Center: The Promise of Moderation."
If your family is from this part of the world, what's changed for you? 800-989-8255. Email email@example.com. And Ibrahim(ph) is on the line from Tulsa.
IBRAHIM: Hello, Neal, thank you very much. I enjoy your show.
CONAN: Thank you.
IBRAHIM: The question is: With all this Arab Spring and all the changes and (unintelligible) that is happening, in what way do you think the U.S. policy will change with these changes in place? Because the U.S. policy in the past, as we all know, were more inclined towards supporting the dictators in all these regions, and they were aligned with them.
With the Spring coming on and the freedom coming on, in what way will the U.S. policy change in the immediate future and in the long run? And I'll take my answer off the air, thank you.
CONAN: All right, thanks very much for the call. And Marwan Muasher, I'll throw that to you. What do you think?
MUASHER: Well, in the past there is no question that the United States prioritized stability over democracy, or over reform, if you want. We've heard rhetoric since the Arab uprisings that suggest that the United States want to pursue a new policy of stability through reform rather than over reform.
Frankly, that has not been yet translated into any meaningful new policy. First of all, Arab countries are different, and there are different interests for the United States in each Arab country, and that explains in part why the reaction to Libya has been different than the reaction to Bahrain, has been different than the reaction to Syria.
And therefore, while it is easy to say that from now on, the United States is going to sort of prioritize democracy more, the interest part of the equation suggests that that so far has not yet been translated into any clear policy.
I think that's frankly shortsighted. I think that there is a new atmosphere in the Arab world and that if the United States is going to continue to apply old policies to new realities, it will continue to suffer from a credibility gap, which is becoming, you know, bigger and bigger by the day in the region.
CONAN: Yet you see the - at least some representatives of the Saudi government, the monarchy there, bitterly criticizing the United States for, as they see, abandoning their old friend President Mubarak in his time of need and making it clear that they would brook no American effort to support the protestors in Bahrain, which they see as vital bulwark against Iran.
MUASHER: I see a growing gap between Saudi Arabia and the United States in the coming period. When the issues were peace and security, two issues that both countries saw eye-to-eye on, even with 9/11, the two countries were able to cooperate very effectively on these two issues.
Now that the issue of reform has come in, it's a complicating factor. It's an issue that both countries do not agree on, and I do not yet see any serious move on each part to actually address this and come to terms with it. I do see a growing gap there.
CONAN: Let's go next to - I'm sorry, did you want to say something, Dalia?
MOGAHED: I was going to say that supporting democracy is in the long-term interest of the United States, and I think President Obama has articulated that. To make that - if that is really our interest as Americans, I think there's three things that we can do to make that happen.
Number one, we need to step back and allow the political process in Tunisia and Egypt to take its own path. The worst thing that we can do for our allies, right now, is impose or get - or become too helpful in that political process.
CONAN: Do you see any sign of that?
MOGAHED: I think that there are intentions to want to help. What the Egyptian people have made very clear in our research is that they don't want any outside influence, and they're especially afraid of American manipulation of their political system.
They don't want any outside funding to political groups, for example. And that is especially the case among those who see America as a political model.
CONAN: Okay, let's get another caller in. Let's go to Khalid(ph), Khalid with us from Union City in California.
KHALID: Yes, hi, I have a question for both guests, actually two questions, if I can. Why do you think there is no uprising in countries like Algeria and Sudan the same way we see it in Northern African countries? And my second part of the question is that do you think the U.S. will treat an uprising in the Palestinian territories against Israeli occupation the same way they treat the uprising in Syria or Libya? And I'll take my answer off the phone.
CONAN: Okay, thanks very much. The first question, well, Sudan seems to be a little bit busy at the moment.
MUASHER: Sudan has indeed a number of problems, including Darfur, including Abyei, including, you know...
CONAN: South Sudan.
MUASHER: South Sudan. So I think they're a bit busy with their own. But I think that this is a phenomenon that we have seen in countries that are not very homogenous and where different communities have different needs and demands.
So you've seen in Iraq. You've seen it in Lebanon where there is no national consensus on the demands of the country and where there are - there is a weak central, if you want, government and sectarian needs and interests. That might explain in part why we have not seen the same kind of uprisings that we have seen elsewhere.
On the Palestinian issue, I think that I've always said the United States is not going to be able to regain any form of credibility with the region if it argues to the region, that if you are an Egyptian or a Libyan or a Syrian yearning for freedom, then we are with you, but if you are a Palestinian yearning for freedom, it's complicated.
That's not an argument that will win hearts, not just among the Palestinians, but among the rest of the Arab world. What will happen also if the Palestinians treat also, you know, participate in these uprisings in a peaceful way, I think that will put Israel in a very difficult position, where the Israelis will not be able to, you know, shoot Palestinians for weeks or months.
CONAN: Well, it could also be quite a challenge to the Palestinian Authority.
MUASHER: Absolutely, absolutely. I mean, you cannot really exclude any Arab country from what is going on. I think that this is a feeling, as we talked before, of power - of empowerment that is sort of new in the Arab world, a feeling that people can effect change and can effect change peacefully.
CONAN: Dalia Mogahed, why Egypt and Tunisia and not Algeria?
MOGAHED: Well, I think there are a number of reasons. But one possible reason is things according to our research are actually a little better in Algeria. So what we found in Egypt and Tunisia before the revolutions is that their sense of life satisfaction - it's an index that we measure around the world - the life satisfaction index of Tunisians and Egyptians was plummeting as their GDP per capita was rising, and they were getting accolades from everyone about their economic reform.
It - not only wasn't it trickling it down, but it was actually causing people to plummet further and further into poverty. We don't see the same - at least not to the same degree in Algeria.
CONAN: Marwan Muasher has to leave us in a couple of minutes, and I wanted to take advantage of his presence for the moment. We've been talking about places where either there was dramatic change - Tunisia and Egypt - or whether there are promises of reform in Bahrain or Jordan, and we'll have to see whether that happens or the degree to which that happens in those place.
Clearly, Libya and Syria are different cases. Libya, you can sort of see what the end will be, how we get there quite nobody knows. Syria is, well, this is very dangerous.
MUASHER: It is indeed. This is a minority regime where not 10 percent rule over, you know, 90 percent of the population. Any reform, any serious reform process, for such a regime means that they will, you know, be out of the picture.
CONAN: Lose power.
MUASHER: And therefore, there is no interest on the part of the regime to, you know, engage in any such serious reform. If I, frankly, have to make a prediction of where these three countries will be a year from now, I would say that they will have different systems in all three of them.
CONAN: Really, change in all three?
MUASHER: I think so.
CONAN: You can see it in Libya. It's a little hard to see in Syria or at least the mechanism is going to be hard to see.
MUASHER: I think any regime that goes against its own people and starts killing its own people has lost any kind of legitimacy it has. It is very difficult for such a regime, whether it is in Syria or otherwise, to, you know, rebound back from the situation.
CONAN: Marwan Muasher, thank you very much for your time today. We appreciate it. We're sorry you have another engagement, but we understand you have to leave. So we appreciate it.
MUASHER: Thank you.
CONAN: Marwan Muasher, vice president for studies and Middle East specialist of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, foreign - former foreign minister of Jordan, who also served as Jordan's ambassador to the United States. He joined us here in Studio 3A. We're going to continue with Dalia Mogahed, who's executive director of the Gallup Center for Muslim Studies, co-author of "Who Speaks for Islam: What a Billion Muslims Really Think."
And this - let's go next to - this is - if I hit the right button, Ahmed(ph), Ahmed with us from Bloomfield in Michigan.
AHMED: Yes. Oh, thank you for taking my phone.
CONAN: Sure. Go ahead, please.
AHMED: All righty. I got a comment and a question.
CONAN: Go ahead.
AHMED: The comment, first, is about all these dictators or autocrats that have ruled the Arab countries for the past 30 or 40 years. Those guys have not done anything good for their people other than the whole time, their time is preoccupied with just holding onto power. And my question is, why, all of a sudden, after 30 or 40 years that the West, and especially the United States, figured that these guys are no good, and now they are on the bad side? Where, like, Hosni Mubarak, I mean, he served the interest of America more than the interests of his people.
I had - my father, he visited Egypt about two years ago. And the poverty that he saw in Egypt, he said he's never seen in his life. And on the other hand, the guy has accumulated 50 or $60 billion. And I wanted to see why - I mean, I could have told you this 20 years ago, where you guys, nobody wanted him. And speaking as an Iraqi-American, I know, you know, we've been through a lot in Iraq with Saddam Hussein. But back in the days when Saddam used to serve the interests of the United States, you know, with the Iraq-Iran War, everybody, you know, including Secretary of State Rumsfeld who went and visited in 1980, shook his hand and patted him on the back. All of a sudden, he became a bad guy. And I wanted to see why, all of a sudden, again, with all these guys in the Middle East now that, oh, you know what? Oh, by the way, these guys are all bad. We should get rid of them.
CONAN: Well, things have changed, Ahmed. But that's a short answer. As you think of the example of Saddam Hussein, though, these strong men - the autocrats, as we describe them - they did serve a purpose of stability. They held places together - obviously, Iraq undone, certainly, at the hands of the United States, but clearly a lot of that instability was there already. That was inherent in Iraqi society. Saddam ruled with an iron fist, of course, but he held a society - that country together and all the competing interests. And, Dalia Mogahed, that is not inconsiderable. You have to count that as part of it.
MOGAHED: You certainly do. And I think one of the most interesting questions I get when I go to Cairo is why did it take Obama so long to side with the people? In their view, it took him forever, that he only did it at the very end when it was apparent that there was no turning back. And I think that what's important to understand is at the end of the day, America has its interests. And its interests were, at one point, served by these autocrats. When these dictators became unable to deliver stability because the people had risen up and had made their desires clear, had refused to accept the status quo, then America's interests simply shift.
They shift to the people versus their dictator, and that's why we change sides. I think that that's something we're always going to do as a nation-state with interests. We will always go with where our interests lie. And at this point, it is with the people, and so we have to shift our policies to where our interests now are.
CONAN: We're talking about what comes after the Arab Spring. You're listening to TALK OF THE NATION from NPR News. And let's go next to Hamid(ph), Hamid with us from Denver.
HAMID: Good afternoon, gentleman. Wonderful program.
CONAN: Thank you.
HAMID: And lady, of course. I wanted to make a correction. I do not consider any of these revolutions. Fifty, 60,000 people on the streets of Cairo do not represent 80 million Egyptians, and I support them. This is not in disagreement with the cause. As the wonderful site STRATFOR, Strategic Forecasting, correctly analyzes the situation in the Arab world, these are minor shifts that are going to lead to major things. By no means these should be called revolutions. There is no such a thing as Arab streets.
And the lady was correct just now by mentioning this is about the interest of the United States, as well as it should be. And Mr. Mubarak was just the last brick on the tip of the pyramid. The military regime that is in power did this, got rid of him, and he will have a little cushy job in Saudi Arabia somewhere (unintelligible)...
CONAN: I suspect not, but...
HAMID: And I do not see Egypt going through a sea change in the way most people, including people in NPR, think that it has gone. Libya is a whole different story, and, of course, Bahrain is a whole different story. Bahrain has nothing to do with what you have talked about. Bahrain is about Iran trying to wedge its way into the region, taking advantage of the vacuum the U.S. is about to leave by letting Iranians run the show in that area.
CONAN: Let's stick to Egypt just for a moment. And we're talking about...
MOGAHED: Well, thank you for your analysis. I do have a different analysis, however. According to our research, 83 percent of Egyptians say they supported the protests that overthrew Mubarak. Eleven percent actually participated in them. And that's about seven million people, at some point, participated in the protests. So it was much more than 60,000.
Now, what the future holds for Egypt, will it be a sea change or will it be just an upgraded autocracy? Of course, it's hard to tell. But what has changed, and what has changed fundamentally is the psychology of the populace. It is a - it has gone from submissive and willing to accept abuse, essentially, to one that has a sense of entitlement and a sense of ownership for their future. And I do think that that is an important change that will ultimately determine the makeup of the next government.
CONAN: Hamid, thanks very much for the call.
HAMID: I hope, too.
CONAN: Well, let's hope so. Anyway, appreciate the phone call. And Dalia Mogahed, thank you very much for your time today.
MOGAHED: Thank you. It's a pleasure.
CONAN: Dalia Mogahed, executive director of the Gallup Center for Muslim Studies. Her book, "Who Speaks for Islam?: What a Billion Muslims Really Think."
Coming up, Jay Bahadur wanted a close-up look at modern piracy, so he spent three months in Somalia talking with pirates and learning that much of what we thought about them is wrong. Join us for that. Stay with us. I'm Neal Conan. It's the TALK OF THE NATION, from NPR News.
What images spring to mind when you hear the country UAE?
What are the good things and bad things about the UAE?
What is the UAE most famous for?
What do you know about the UAE’s history?
What are the differences between the UAE and your country?
What do you think about Emirati people?
What has the UAE given to the world?
Would you like to visit the UAE, or live there?
What do you know about the geography of the UAE?
Who are the most famous Emirati people you know?
How different is the UAE from other Middle East countries?
What was the last news story you heard about the UAE?
What do you think the UAE’s neighbours think of it?
What do you think the UAE will be like 50 years from now?
Does your country have good relations with the UAE?
What could you do on a holiday in the UAE?
What is your idea of a typical Emirati person?
What things about the UAE do you think Emiratis are proud of?
What do you know about Emirati culture?
What would you like to ask an Emirati about the UAE?
United Arab Emirates
The United Arab Emirates is a constitutional federation of seven emirates; Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Umm al-Qaiwain, Ras al-Khaimah and Fujairah. The federation was formally established on 2 December 1971.
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) occupies an area of 83,600 sq km along the south-eastern tip of the Arabian Peninsula. Qatar lies to the west, Saudi Arabia to the south and west, and Oman to the north and east. The capital and the largest city of the federation, Abu Dhabi, is located in the emirate of the same name.
Four-fifths of the UAE is desert, yet it is a country of contrasting landscapes, from awe-inspiring dunes to rich oases, precipitous rocky mountains to fertile plains.
The United Arab Emirates, one of the world's fastest growing tourist destinations, has all the right ingredients for an unforgettable holiday, sun, sand, sea, sports, unbeatable shopping, top-class hotels and restaurants, an intriguing traditional culture, and a safe and welcoming environment.
About United Arab Emirates
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is a federation of seven emirates that was formed in December 2, 1971.
Conventional Long Form: United Arab Emirates Local Long Form (Arabic): Dawlat Al Imarat Al Arabiyya Al Muttahidah Local Short Form (Arabic): Al Imarat Abbreviation: UAE Arabic Words: دولة الإمارات العربية المتحدة
Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Umm al-Qaiwain, Ras al-Khaimah and Fujairah
Independence Day (from UK), 2 December (1971)
HH Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan (3 November 2004)
Vice-President & Prime Minister
HH Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum (5 January 2006)
A federation with specific areas of authority constitutionally assigned to the UAE Federal Government and other powers reserved for member emirates
Adopted provisionally on 2 December 1971, made permanent in 1996
83,600 square kilometers
UAE Standard Time is 4 hours ahead of Greenwich Mean Time (GMT+4)
Daylight Saving Time
UAE Time does not operate Daylight-Saving Time
International Dialing Code
Emirati Dirham (Dh or AED), divided into 100 Fils
US$ 1 = AED 3.6725 The UAE Dirham has been officially pegged to the US dollar since February 2002
The official language is Arabic. English is widely understood and ranks alongside Arabic as the language of commerce
Islam. Practice of all religious beliefs is allowed
Friday and Saturday for government institutions. Many private companies operate a six-day week (with Friday as an off day)
AED 424 billion (2005)
AED 63.9 billion (2005)
AED 139.5 billion (2005)
AED 261.2 billion (2005)
260,000 hectares, 3.1% of total territory
Number of Date Palms
Over 40 million
Agriculture & Fisheries Products
Dates, Green Fodder, Vegetables and Fruit; Livestock, Poultry, Eggs, Dairy Products; Fish
Estimated Fisheries Catch
Government and Political System
Since the establishment of the federation in 1971, the seven emirates that comprise the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have forged a distinct national identity through consolidation of their federal status and enjoy an enviable degree of political stability. The UAE's political system, a unique combination of the traditional and the modern, has underpinned this political success, enabling the country to develop a modern administrative structure while, at the same time, ensuring that the best of the traditions of the past are maintained, adapted and preserved.
Each of the component emirates already had its own existing institutions of government prior to 1971 and, to provide for the effective governing of the new state, the rulers agreed to draw up a provisional Constitution specifying the powers that were to be allocated to the new federal institutions, all others remaining the prerogative of the emirates.
Areas of responsibility assigned to the federal authorities, under Articles 120 and 121 of the Constitution, were foreign affairs, security and defense, nationality and immigration issues, education, public health, currency, postal, telephone and other communications services, air traffic control and licensing of aircraft, in addition to a number of other topics specifically prescribed, including labor relations, banking, delimitation of territorial waters and extradition of criminals. The Constitution also stated in Article 116 that 'the Emirates shall exercise all powers not assigned to the Federation by this Constitution'. This was reaffirmed in Article 122, which stated that 'the Emirates shall have jurisdiction in all matters not assigned to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federation, in accordance with the provision of the preceding two Articles'.
In May 1996, the Federal Supreme Council approved two amendments to the provisional Constitution, making it permanent and naming Abu Dhabi as the capital of the state.
The federal system of government includes a Supreme Council, a Cabinet, or Council of Ministers, a parliamentary body, the Federal National Council, and an independent judiciary, at the apex of which is the Federal Supreme Court.
Federal Supreme Council
During their initial discussions on forming a federation, the rulers of the seven emirates agreed that each of them would be a member of a Supreme Council, the top policy-making body in the new state and that they would elect a President and a Vice President from amongst their number, to serve for a five-year, renewable, term of office. The Ruler of Abu Dhabi, Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan, was elected as the first President, a post to which he was re-elected at successive five-yearly intervals until his death in November 2004, while the Ruler of Dubai, Sheikh Rashid bin Saeed Al Maktoum, was elected as first Vice President, a post he continued to hold until his death in 1990. Both were succeeded by their Crown Princes, who became rulers of their emirates and were elected by the members of the Federal Supreme Council to become respectively President, for the Ruler of Abu Dhabi, HH Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan, and Vice President, for the Ruler of Dubai. Sheikh Rashid's successor as Vice-President, Sheikh Maktoum, died in early 2006, and was succeeded as ruler by his younger brother and Crown Prince, Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid, who was then elected as the UAE's third Vice President.
The Federal Supreme Council has both legislative and executive powers. It ratifies federal laws and decrees, plans general policy, approves the nomination of the Prime Minister and accepts his resignation. It also relieves him of his post on the recommendation of the President.
Council of Ministers / Cabinet
The Council of Ministers or Cabinet, described in the Constitution as 'the executive authority' for the Federation, includes the usual complement of ministerial portfolios and is headed by a Prime Minister, chosen by the President in consultation with his colleagues on the Supreme Council. The Prime Minister, currently the Vice-President (although this has not always been the case), then selects the ministers, who may be drawn from any of the Federation's component emirates, although, naturally, the more populous emirates have generally provided more members of each Cabinet.
A 24-member Cabinet was appointed on 11 February 2006, according to the proposal of Vice President HH Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum, who had been requested to form a new Government following his accession as Ruler of Dubai and election as Vice-President the previous month. This Cabinet was reshuffled on 17 February 2008 to include a new portfolio for foreign trade and the realignment of several ministries of state.
Parallel to, and interlocking with, the federal institutions, each of the seven emirates also has its own local government. All have expanded significantly as a result of the country's growth over the last 35 years, though they differ in complexity from emirate to emirate, depending on factors such as population, area, and degree of development.
HH Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan (3 November 2004)
Vice-President & Prime Minister
HH Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum (5 January 2006)
Supreme Council Members
HH President Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan, Ruler of Abu Dhabi
HH Vice-President and Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum, Ruler of Dubai
HH Dr Sheikh Sultan bin Mohammed Al Qasimi, Ruler of Sharjah
HH Sheikh Saqr bin Mohammed Al Qasimi, Ruler of Ras Al Khaimah
HH Sheikh Hamad bin Mohammed Al Sharqi, Ruler of Fujairah
HH Sheikh Saud bin Rashid Al Mu'alla, Ruler of Umm Al Qaiwain
HH Sheikh Humaid bin Rashid Al Nuaimi, Ruler of Ajman
HH General Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi and Deputy Supreme Commander of the UAE Armed Forces, Chairman of Abu Dhabi Executive Council
HH Sheikh Hamdan bin Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum, Crown Prince of Dubai and Chairman of Dubai Executive Council
HH Sheikh Sultan bin Mohammed Al Qasimi, Crown Prince and Deputy Ruler of Sharjah, Chairman of Sharjah Executive Council
HH Sheikh Saud bin Saqr Al Qasimi, Crown Prince and Deputy Ruler of Ras Al Khaimah
HH Sheikh Mohammed bin Hamed Al Sharqi, Crown Prince of Fujairah
HH Sheikh Ammar bin Humaid Al Nuaimi, Crown Prince of Ajman
HH Sheikh Rashid bin Saud bin Rashid Al Mu'alla, Crown Prince of Umm Al Qaiwain
Deputies of the Rulers
HH Sheikh Hamdan bin Rashid Al Maktoum, Deputy Ruler of Dubai, Minister of Finance and Industry
HH Sheikh Maktoum bin Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum, Deputy Ruler of Dubai
HH Sheikh Ahmed bin Sultan Al Qasimi, Deputy Ruler of Sharjah
HH Sheikh Abdullah bin Salim bin Sultan Al Qasimi, Deputy Ruler of Sharjah
HH Sheikh Sultan bin Saqr Al Qasimi, Deputy Ruler of Ras Al Khaimah
HH Sheikh Hamad bin Saif Al Sharqi, Deputy Ruler of Fujairah
HH Sheikh Abdullah bin Rashid Al Mu'alla, Deputy Ruler of Umm Al Qaiwain
Members of the Cabinet
Prime Minister and Minister of Defence: Vice President HH Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Interior: HH Lt Gen. Sheikh Saif bin Zayed Al Nahyan
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Presidential Affairs: HH Sheikh Mansour bin Zayed Al Nahyan
Minister of Finance: HH Sheikh Hamdan bin Rashid Al Maktoum
Minister of Interior: HH Lt Gen. Sheikh Saif bin Zayed Al Nahyan
Minister of Foreign Affairs: HH Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan
Minister of Higher Education and Scientific Research: Sheikh Nahyan bin Mubarak Al Nahyan
Minister of Public Works: Sheikh Hamdan bin Mubarak Al Nahyan
Minister of Foreign Trade: Sheikha Lubna Al Qasimi
Minister of Cabinet Affairs: Mohammed Abdullah Al Gargawi
Minister of Energy: Mohammed bin Dha'en Al Hamili
Minister of Economy: Sultan bin Saeed Al Mansouri
Minister of Social Affairs: Mariam Mohammed Khalfan Al Roumi
Minister of Health: Dr Hanif Hassan Ali
Minister of Education: Humaid Mohammed Obaid Al Qattami
Minister of Culture, Youth and Community Development: Abdul Rahman Mohammed Al Owais
Minister of Justice: Dr Hadef bin Jua'an Al Dhaheri
Minister of Environment and Water: Rashid Ahmed bin Fahad
Minister of Labour: Saqr Ghobash Saeed Ghobash
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs and Minister of State for Federal National Council Affairs: Dr Mohammed Anwar Gargash
Minister of State for Financial Affairs: Obaid Humaid Al Tayer
Minister of State: Dr Maitha Salem Al Shamsi
Minister of State: Dr Khalifa Bakheet Al Falasi
Minister of State: Reem Ibrahim Al Hashimi
Chairman of Federal National Council
Abdul Aziz Abdulla Al Ghurair (12 February 2007)
STUDENT A’s QUESTIONS(Do not show to Student B)
What images spring to mind when you hear the season “spring’?
How do you feel when spring arrives?
What things about spring do you like most and least?
What happens in spring in your country?
In what ways is spring the best season?
Do you always do spring cleaning?
Are spring onions best eaten in spring?
Is spring the same in all parts of the world?
Are there any special events that take place in spring in your country?
“Spring is nature's way of saying, ‘Let's party!’” - Robin Williams. Do you agree?
STUDENT B’s QUESTIONS (Do not show to Student A)
What do you like to do in spring that you can’t do at other times of the year?
Does spring make you look forward to the year?
How would you feel if there wasn’t spring?
What does spring the season have in common with ‘spring’ the verb?
Would you like it to be spring forever?
What’s your favourite spring memory?
What clothes do you like to wear when spring arrives?
Do you think spring feels differently to people of different ages?
What adjectives would you use to describe spring?
"Spring shows what God can do with a drab and dirty world." - Virgil A. Kraft. Do you agree?
STUDENT A’s QUESTIONS(Do not show to Student B)
What images spring to mind when you hear the word ‘racism’?
How much racism is there in your country?
Have you ever been the victim of racism?
What do you do when you see racism against others?
Have you ever done anything to help stamp out racism?
In which country do you think racism is worst?
Why are people racist?
Who is the biggest racist you know?
Is racism getting worse or disappearing in your country?
What kind of world would it be if there was no racism?
STUDENT B’s QUESTIONS (Do not show to Student A)
Do you ever have racist thoughts?
Do you think racism will ever disappear from this world?
How do you explain racism to a child?
What races do people in your country discriminate against?
What punishments should there be for those guilty of racism?
What’s the best way to stamp out racism?
What’s the worst example of racism you’ve witnessed or experienced?
Do you think racism feels differently to black, white, Asian, Indian, Arab… people?
What adjectives would you use to describe racism?
What is worse, racism, sexism or homophobia?
STUDENT A’s QUESTIONS(Do not show to Student B)
Who are the Arabs?
What makes an Arab an Arab?
What major contributions has Arab civilization made to the world?
What countries have predominantly Arab populations?
What do you know of the past history of the Arabs?
What do you know of the recent history of the Arabs?
Have you been to any Arab countries?
Does the media in your country portray a negative or positive image of Arabs?
What Arab cultural influences affect today’s world?
What do you know about Arabs and Western colonialism?
STUDENT B’s QUESTIONS (Do not show to Student A)
What do all Arabs have in common?
Is there one Arab country that is more influential than the others?
What is the source of animosities between Arab countries and Israel?
What cultural differences are the among Arabs from different Arab nations?
What are the differences between the words ‘Arab’, ‘Arabic’ and ‘Arabian’?
Who is the greatest Arab leader?
What stereotypes of Arabs exist in your country?
How much political or economic power do Arabs have in the world?
What is the Arab League and how strong and unified is it?
Do you think Arabs will play a greater role in world affairs in the future?
STUDENT A’s QUESTIONS(Do not show to Student B)
What comes to mind when you hear the word ‘Egypt’?
Do you think Egypt is one of the greatest countries in the world?
What is your opinion of Egypt as a tourist destination?
What do you know about the history of Egypt?
What has Egypt given to the world?
Do you think Egypt is a dangerous or safe country?
Do you know anything about Egyptian politics?
What would you like to do if you had 24 hours in Egypt?
What would you like to do if you had a year in Egypt?
What kind of relations does your country have with Egypt?
STUDENT B’s QUESTIONS (Do not show to Student A)
What are the differences between Egypt today and Egypt in the past?
What things is Egypt famous for?
What do you know about Egypt’s cities?
What do you know about Egyptian culture?
What is Egypt famous for producing?
Who are the most famous Egyptians you know?
What problems are there in Egypt?
What role does Egypt play in the Middle East? Should it do more
What do you think it would be like to go back in time and live in Ancient Egypt?